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The WTO Ruling on Foreign Sales
Corporations: Costliest Battle Yet in an
Escalating Trade War Between the United
States and the European Union?
Hunter R. Clark, Amy Bogran & Hayley Hanson*
I. THE COSTLIEST BATTLE YET IN AN ESCALATING
TRADE WAR?
With exports worth roughly $960 billion during 1999, the
United States finished the millennium as the world's largest
exporter of goods and services.' This may have been in part
because of U.S. tax laws that encouraged export industries.
Until recently, under the U.S. Internal Revenue Service Tax
Code ("I.R.C."), Foreign Sales Corporations ("FSCs") could use
special administrative pricing methods 2 that exempted fifteen
percent to thirty percent of their export profits from taxation by
the United States. 3 Approximately 7,000 American companies,
and some twenty European firms, formed FSCs to take
advantage of these and other tax incentives.4 These companies
*Hunter R. Clark, Professor of Law, Drake University Law School; J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1979; A.B., cum laude, Harvard College, 1976. Amy Bogran, LL.M.,
University of Miami School of Law, 2000; J.D., Drake University Law School, 1998.
Hayley Hanson, J.D., Drake University Law School, 2000.
1. See John R. Magnus, et al., International Legal Developments in Review:
1999, 34 INT'L LAw. 501, 501 (2000) (citing Bureau of Census, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, FT 900 (March 2000), available at http://www.census.gov.foreign-
trade/www/tradedata.html). During the same year, U.S. imports reached a record
$1,228 billion, making the U.S. the world's largest importer, as well. See id.
2. For a discussion of how these administrative pricing methods operated, see
William Lee Andrews, III, No Bull's Eye for "Targeted" International Tax Rules, 18
VA. TAx REV. 781, 817-22 (1999). An exhaustive examination of the complex and
myriad tax rules that applied to FSCs is beyond the scope of this article.
3. Time Extended for Filing FSC Grouping Redeterminations, J. INT'L TAX'N,
Aug. 1999, at 4.
4. Gordon Platt, Abstract, U.S. Tax Breaks Are Still Available, J. COM., Oct.
18, 1999, at 5. As of 1998, Siemens, ICI, Daimler-Benz, BP, Unilever, BASF,
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included American corporate giants that are household names,
such as Boeing, General Electric, Mars, Nike, and Proctor &
Gamble. 5 However, it appears that European opposition may
finally bring an end to the FSC regime that has by the United
States Treasury's estimate saved U.S. corporations upwards of
four billion dollars a year in taxes. 6
According to the European Union ("EU"), those tax savings
came at the expense of European businesses. The EU claims
that FSC rules put European businesses at a competitive
disadvantage by allowing U.S. exporters to profit from "shell
firms set up as off-shore paper subsidiaries" 7 in tax havens such
as Barbados, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.8 European dismay
over the tax breaks dates back at least a quarter-century. In
1972, for example, the European Community ("EC") charged in
a complaint under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") that U.S. tax laws permitting exporters to defer taxes
on a portion of their export earnings violated GATT prohibitions
on export subsidies.9 The legislation that created FSCs was
"enacted as part of the bilateral settlement in 1981 of [the]
GATT complaint filed by the EC against a predecessor U.S. tax
provision."10
More recently, the EU has sought redress through the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"). The Europeans have
followed procedures required by the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU") to charge that the tax relief given to
FSCs violates global trading rules." For example, the EU
complained that I.R.C. provisions that allowed FSCs to use
special formulas to calculate transfer pricing, or which
permitted FSCs to choose among a group of advantageous
Hoechst, Elf-Aquitane and Rhone-Poulenc are some of the European corporations
that had created FSCs to save on U.S. taxes. See Mid-air Collision, ECONOMIST,
March 7, 1998, at 76.
5. See Geoff Winestock, EU Aims for Huge Sanctions on the U.S., WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 20, 2000, at A2; see also Paul Meller, Europeans Seek $4 Billion in Trade
Sanctions Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at C1.
6. See Winestock, supra note 5.
7. EUIUS: Americans Contest EU Demand for USD4 Billion Sanctions, EUR.
REP., Dec. 2, 2000, at 2000 WL 24320190.
8. See Winestock, supra note 5; see also Glenn Hess, US Shrugs Off EU
Threat to Start FSC Tax-Related Trade Sanctions, CHEMICAL MKT. REP., Nov. 20,
2000, 2000 WL 24156581; Meller, supra note 5.
9. See Robert A. Green, Antilegalistic Approaches to Resolving Disputes
Between Governments: A Comparison of the International Tax and Trade Regimes,
23 YALE J. INVL L. 79, 90 (1998).
10. Magnus, et al., supra note 1, at 507.
11. Time Extended for Filing FSC Grouping Redeterminations, supra note 3.
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pricing formulas, constituted an illegal subsidy.12 On October 8,
1999, a WTO dispute panel handed the EU a victory, ruling that
FSC tax breaks do indeed constitute illegal subsidies. 13 The
panel's decision called for the United States to repeal or modify
the I.R.C. provisions at issue by October 1, 2000.14 On February
24, 2000, the United States lost its appeal of that panel ruling.15
Whether the United States will comply with the WTO
decision, and how it will do so, remains to be seen. American
negotiators and their counterparts from the EU met in
September 2000 and agreed to extend for a month the October 1,
2000 deadline for U.S. compliance. 16 The negotiated deadline
lapsed, however, when American legislation aimed at remedying
the dispute "became entangled in an election-year squabble in
Congress between Republicans and Democrats...." 17
After the November 2000 presidential election, however,
Congress passed the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act of 2000 ("FSC Repeal Act").' 8 When he signed the
bill into law in November 2000, President Clinton explained,
"[t]his legislation is necessary to address a World Trade
Organization Appellate Body finding that the Foreign Sales
Corporation (FSC) provisions of U.S. tax law violated the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the
Agreement on Agriculture."19 He concluded, "We believe that
this legislation specifically addresses the concerns raised by the
WTO Appellate Body and will be found to be WTO-compliant." 20
The Europeans disagreed with the President's assessment.
12. See WTO Panel Report on United States: Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales
Corporations, WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999) para. 7.35, at http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter "WTO Panel Report"]. For a discussion of I.R.C. transfer pricing rules,
see Paul B. Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade
Organization, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 49, 62 (2000).
13. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 7.130
14. See id. para. 8.8.
15. See Report of the Appellate Body on United States: Tax Treatment for
Foreign Sales Corporations, WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000) para. 177, at http://
www.wto.org [hereinafter "Report of the Appellate Body"].
16. EU/ US: Americans Contest EU Demand for USD4 Billion Sanctions, supra
note 7.
17. House Approves US Tax Overhaul Demanded by WTO, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Nov. 15, 2000, 2000 WL 24759323.
18. FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
"FSC Repeal Act"].
19. Statement on Signing the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act of 2000, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2885 (Nov. 20, 2000).
20. Id.
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European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy went so far as to
call the new law "even worse" than the old one.21 As its name
suggests, the FSC Repeal Act repealed the I.R.C.'s FSC
provisions in their entirety, and changed the way in which the
United States taxes income generated outside the United
States.22 Nonetheless, the bill's intended impact may be
overstated. According to The Wall Street Journal, the legislation
"rewrites the legal basis for the [FSCI program and eliminates
the need to set up an offshore company. But it maintains
roughly the same level of benefits for the same companies, even
increasing them for arms exporters that previously only
qualified for a partial benefit."23
At about the same time that Clinton signed the FSC Repeal
Act, the EU asked the WTO to approve approximately four
billion dollars in retaliatory trade sanctions against the United
States.24 The Europeans subsequently published a list of the
American goods against which the penalty tariffs would be
targeted, including "46 general categories of products ranging
from live animals to spacecraft." 25 The four billion dollar claim
is by far the largest in the WTO's brief history, although it is
lower than the twenty-six billion dollar claim that some
American officials expected. 26 The four billion dollar figure is
also in line with what the U.S. Treasury estimated to be the
annual dollar value of the FSC tax benefit to American
corporations.27
Under an agreement with the EU, the WTO will not
authorize the sanctions proposed by the EU until a WTO panel
of experts has reviewed the new FSC legislation to determine
whether it in fact conforms to WTO rules.28 Lamy has explained,
"[a]lthough we believe the FSC replacement legislation does not
solve the problem, the EU will leave it to the WTO to rule on
this question. That's what the WTO is there for."29 The WTO's
21. EU! US: Americans Contest EU Demand for USD4 Billion Sanctions, supra
note 7.
22. For a detailed discussion of the FSC Repeal Act, see George G Jones &
Mark A. Luscombe, The New Extraterritorial Income Exclusion, ACCOUNTING
TODAY, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 WL 11748592.
23. See Winestock, supra note 5.
24. See id.; Hess, supra note 8; Meller, supra note 5.
25. Winestock, supra note 5.
26. See id.
27. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
28. See Statement on Signing the FSC Repeal Act, supra note 19.
29. See Winestock, supra note 5.
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decision in the matter is not expected until summer 2001.30
Until it is resolved, the FSC controversy threatens to turn
into the costliest battle yet in the escalating trade war between
the EU and the United States. The two sides already have been
severely at odds over bananas 31 and beef.32 In April 1999, the
United States imposed $191 million in penalty duties on
European goods in retaliation for EU banana import practices
that are alleged to be discriminatory. 33 In July of the same year,
the United States imposed an additional $116 million in
retaliatory tariffs in response to an EU ban on hormone-treated
beef.34 But the total amount involved in those controversies
pales by comparison with the $4 billion in sanctions looming in
the FSC dispute. 35
Before leaving office, former President Clinton expressed
American intentions to "continue working with the EU to
manage this difference of views responsibly and to avoid any
harm to our strong bilateral relationship."36 A month later,
however, he warned of an even bigger battle with the EU that
the United States was prepared to take up over European
support for Airbus Industrie's $12 billion super jumbo-jet
project, the A3XX.37 Prodded by Boeing, the behemoth American
aerodynamics firm, the United States has complained that EU
30. See id.
31. See WTO Panel Report on European Communities: Regime for Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (last modified May 22, 1997) at
http://www.wto.org; see also Agreement Ends Banana Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2001 (late edition), at C1 (reporting the end of the nine year trade dispute).
32. See WTO Panel Report on European Communities: Measures Affecting
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS27/R/USA (last modified Aug. 18, 1997)
at http://www.wto.org.
33. See Winestock, supra note 5.
34. See id.
35. At the center of yet another storm that appeared to be brewing between
Europe and the U.S. by the end of 2000 was the so-called "Byrd Amendment" to the
fiscal year 2001 agricultural appropriations act. See City Briefing: EU-US trade
battle looms, THE GuARIAN, Dec. 28. 2000, available in 2000 WL 31385840; What's
News: Business and Finance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2000, available in 2000 WL-WSJ
26621154. Named after Senator Robert W. Byrd (D-West Virginia), ranking member
of the Senate Appropriations Committee at the time of its passage, the amendment
"requires that income from tariffs in trade disputes be distributed to the injured
industry and workers," thus softening the impact of retaliatory trade sanctions on
those industries and their workers. EU Threatened Retaliation Over U.S. Carousel
Plan, CONG. DAILY, Dec. 1, 2000, 2000 WL 27012847. "Many trade analysts believe
the measure violates WTO rules." Id.
36. See Statement on Signing the FSC Repeal Act, supra note 19.
37. See Clinton Warns of Trade Fight Over Airbus Subsidies, WASH. POST, Dec.
19, 2000, at All.
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support for Airbus violates global trade rules. 38 Clinton
administration officials said in December 2000 that the United
States had not ruled out filing a WTO complaint against the EU
over the A3XX.39
In the meantime, the EU's agreement to await WTO review
of the FSC Repeal Act before imposing retaliatory sanctions has
bought time for the United States to reconsider the FSC Repeal
Act. As a practical matter, however, it may be hard for the
United States to change a tax policy that powerful corporate
interests favor for obvious reasons. Yet, there are sound bases
for abandoning that policy which, as will be discussed, may do
more harm than good to American companies by in effect
offering them tax breaks that tend to undermine their overall
competitiveness.
Part II of this Article examines the factors that led to the
EU's claim that the FSC provisions violate WTO rules, and
explores the history of FSCs, which were a replacement for the
Domestic International Sales Corporations ("DISCs") legislation
enacted during the 1970s to promote American exports. 40 Part
III explains the WTO dispute settlement process. Contrary to
what some Americans think, the WTO has no authority to force
the U.S. to change its tax code.41 In fact, the purpose of the WTO
dispute settlement process is to encourage communication
between aggrieved parties. The system is set up to foster an
adjudicative, or rule-based approach, that encourages the
parties involved in a dispute to reach a settlement while
advancing the overall goal of freer trade.
Part IV of the article discusses the October 8, 1999 panel
ruling of the WTO. The goal is to simplify an 800-page ruling
made by a panel of international trade experts by identifying
exactly what it was about FSCs that the WTO found to violate
global trade agreements.4 2 Furthermore, the analysis will
explain the WTO panel's interpretation of a "subsidy," and how
the U.S. tax code enabled FSCs to avoid paying taxes on
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. For a discussion of DISCs, see Ricardo Corona, Comment, The Continuing
Viability of the Banking and Financial DISC: A Tool for Sheltering Export Finance
Income, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 361 (1995).
41. One of the arguments against the WTO is that membership results in the
loss of sovereignty. This is simply not true because disputes are only between the
parties. So, in the end, it is up to the European Union to either negotiate a
settlement with the United States or retaliate in some way.
42. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12.
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portions of exported goods.
Part V describes the U.S. position regarding the tax
treatment of FSCs. The United States contends that the EU is
allowing its members to give the same tax treatment to its
companies that the United States gave to FSCs.43
Finally, Parts VI and VII discuss the U.S. appeal and the
viable options for resolving the dispute. There are several
alternatives that the United States will have to weigh and
consider. If the United States does not change its tax code in a
way that comports with the WTO's ruling, despite sound
reasons for doing so, the United States could face some four
billion dollars in retaliatory trade sanctions by the EU.
Moreover, for reasons that will be discussed, the unresolved
dispute threatens the viability, and perhaps even the continued
existence, of the WTO.
II. THE BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF FOREIGN
SALES CORPORATIONS
A. DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES CORPORATIONS ("DISCS")
Tax code incentives to promote export trade have existed for
nearly three decades. In 1971, Congress created the Domestic
International Sales Corporation (DISC) to increase exports and
reduce an increasing trade deficit. 44 DISCs were used to defer
taxes, at the corporate level, on income generated from export
sales. The income was not taxed until it was distributed to the
shareholders of the DISC as dividends, at which time it was
taxed at the shareholder level. As long as the DISC did not pay
dividends, reinvested the income in qualified export assets, and
did not run afoul of any of the other income rules; it could
indefinitely defer payment of its corporate taxes.45 In effect,
DISCs were allowed a tax exemption from federal corporate
taxes for one-half of the profits accumulated from exports. 46 The
tax exemptions allowed DISCs to achieve the two main goals of
the DISC legislation: (1) enabling exporters to lower their prices
43. Helene Cooper, U.S. Tax Break Rejected by WTO is Similar to Europe's
Own System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2000, at A17.
44. Corona, supra note 40, at 363.
45. S. REP. No. 437 (1971); see also Corona, supra note 40, at 364.
46. Kenneth Simon, The Great DISC Controversy, 2 B.U. J. TAX L. 115, 123-24
(1984).
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due to tax reduction; and (2) increasing profitability of exporting
with the intention of drawing a greater number of American
firms into the exportation field.47 To qualify as a DISC under the
tax code, an American corporation had to comply with the
following criteria:
(1) ninety-five percent or more of its gross receipts must be "qualified
export receipts." These are specifically detailed in the Code and
Regulations but, generally, are sales or income from sales by a DISC to
a purchaser "for direct use, consumption or disposition outside the
United States;" (2) ninety-five percent of the assets must be "qualified
export assets;" (3) the firm has only one class of stock and at least
$2,500 in capital; (4) the corporation has elected to be a DISC. 48
DISCs were very popular in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, in
1972 there were approximately 1,100 DISCs in the United
States. By 1981, that number soared to an estimated 13,800. 49
Experts estimate that in 1979 alone the DISC legislation
increased exports by $2.5 billion.50
Shortly after the enactment of the DISC legislation,
European GATT members challenged it as creating an illegal
deferral of direct taxes.51 They argued that the DISC system
resulted in an unlimited deferral of direct taxes, with no rule
preventing the deferral being maintained indefinitely.5 2 In 1976,
a GATT panel concluded the DISC scheme was not a tax
deferral scheme, but instead constituted an illegal subsidy.53 To
avoid retaliation, the U.S. Congress in 1982 announced its
commitment to formulate legislation addressing the concerns of
other GATT countries.54
B. How FSCS WORKED
The Congressional solution to the DISC dispute was the
Foreign Sales Act of 1983, which established FSCs.5 5 Similar to
the DISC regime, the FSC scheme provided for tax incentives to
promote export sales. However, unlike DISCs, an FSC had to be
47. William M. Considine, The DISC Legislation: An Evaluation, 7 N.Y.U. J.
INVL L. & POL. 217, 218 (1974).
48. Corona, supra note 40, at 365-66.
49. Id. at 366.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 367.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 368.
54. Id.
55. The Senate passed the FSC legislation in May of 1984. 130 Cong. Rec.
S5973 (daily ed. May 17, 1984).
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a foreign corporation. To qualify as a foreign corporation, the
FSC had to meet complex foreign management and economic
process tests, unless it qualified as a small FSC, one with export
sales of less than five million dollars.56 Under the applicable tax
rules, the FSC could meet the foreign management requirement
by satisfying three elements:
(1)it holds all board of directors meetings outside the United States; (2)
it maintains its principal bank account outside the United States at all
times during the taxable year; and (3) it disburses all dividends, legal
and accounting fees, and salaries of officers and directors from a bank
account outside the United States.
57
In most cases, an FSC was owned by a corporation and
achieved at least a fifteen percent exemption of its export
income on it American taxes.58 The FSC's income could be
repatriated to the corporate parent in the United States tax-free
by issuing a dividend to the parent. The FSC did not pay U.S.
taxes on the amount of the dividend, but did have to pay taxes
in the foreign jurisdiction where it was established. The parent
corporation did not have to pay taxes on the dividend received.
59
The parent corporation could either retain the dividends or
issue dividends to its shareholders. If the shareholders of the
parent were another corporation, the income could be
distributed tax-free indefinitely or, until it was either
distributed to an individual or a corporation, the recipients had
to pay taxes on the amount received due to other sections of the
I.R.C. After a careful examination of the history of DISCs and
FSCs, it appeared history was repeating itself.
III. WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. PROMOTING CONSULTATION, ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE, AND
FACILITATING RESOLUTION
The WTO dispute resolution process was designed as a
simple way for countries to resolve problems in a manner
beneficial to all parties involved in the dispute. It is important
to have a basic understanding of the dispute resolution process
56. Export Clip & Sace Service Tax Relief for Exporters: DISC vs. FSC, J. COM.,
June 9, 1989, at 1A.
57. Corona, supra note 40, at 369.
58. Id. at 370.
59. I.R.C. § 243 (2000).
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to fully comprehend the events taking place in the dispute
between the EU and the United States over FSCs. The bases of
the WTO system are to promote consultation, encourage
dialogue, and facilitate resolution. It is imperative to recognize
that the WTO dispute resolution process is not primarily
concerned with compensating the victim, but rather with
stopping the violation before the liberalized trade regime is
undermined or comes unraveled.
One of the best functions of the WTO dispute resolution
process is that it prescribes specific steps, each with its own
time limit, that a country must follow to initiate the process. 60
First, a complaining country states the complaint and requests
consultations. 61 The purpose of this step is to get the parties
together to begin discussing the actual problem. The
consultation proceedings are limited to sixty days.62
Second, if the parties do not reach a resolution, they may
either request a panel of experts in the field to hear the
arguments and decide the issues,63 or they can try mediation to
settle the disagreement. 64 Once the panel has made a
determination about the case, its decision is automatically
adopted unless the losing party files notice of its intent to appeal
the decision or the WTO membership by consensus decides not
to adopt it.65 This means that the decision is, in effect, binding
automatically because the winning party has the ability to block
a decision by the WTO membership rejecting the panel's
ruling.66
If the losing party decides to appeal the decision, it presents
its case to the Appellate Body.67 If the Appellate Body rules
against the losing party, that party has three options: 1) subject
itself to immediate retaliation; 2) choose to negotiate
compensation owed to the winning party;68 or 3) change the
regulations or laws that caused the dispute in the first place.
The parties are at all times free to work out a mutually
60. 'See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 435-36
(3d ed. 1999).
61. Id. at 435.
62. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TExT 341 (3d ed. 1995).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 340.
65. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 60, at 436.
66. See Id.
67. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 62, at 340-42. For a more detailed
description of the Appellate Body, see CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 60, at 436-37
68. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 60, at 435.
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acceptable plan. As stated earlier, punishment is not the goal of
the WTO dispute resolution process. Its focus is the continued
promotion of freer trade. Allowing parties to craft their own
solution promotes voluntary compliance with the solution and
the system. This in turn strengthens and legitimizes the WTO.
In fact, studies show that nations have come to rely on the
WTO dispute resolution process more in recent years, which can
be taken as a testament to the efficacy and credibility of that
process.69 As one commentator has observed,
The proliferation of substantive WTO rules, coupled with a quasi-
automatic, rule-based dispute settlement system, [has] led to an
exponentially growing number of disputes being brought to the WTO,
including the politically sensitive ones. This obvious success of the
DSU is testimony to the high expectations that were raised by the new
system.70
B. "ANTILEGALISTIC" VERSUS "LEGALISTIC" DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
Nevertheless, at least one scholar has questioned whether
the DSU provides the appropriate forum for the resolution of tax
disputes. The problem, according to Cornell University law
professor Robert A. Green, is that "legalistic dispute settlement
systems," such as the DSU, "impose costs on cooperative
international regimes" like the WTO.7 1 These costs
include the possibility that the use of confrontational and adversarial
processes will undermine ongoing relationships; that political forces
will lead to conspicuous cases of noncompliance that will threaten the
69. According to one leading publicist, the WTO dispute settlement process
over its first several years was "enormously successful" and had "a more successful
launch than many people anticipated." John H. Jackson, Symposium on the First
Three Years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Introduction and Overview, 32
INT'L LAw. 613, 613 (1998). Moreover, as the last millennium drew to a close, "[ulse
of the WTO dispute settlement system remained at a high level...." John R. Magnus,
C. Christopher Parlin & Navin Joneja, International Legal Developments in Review:
1999 Business Regulation, 34 Int'l Law. 501, 505 (2000). During 1999, for example,
"[t]twenty-eight new requests for consultations were filed, along with twenty-one
requests for the establishment of panels." Id. In addition, the "WTO Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB) was very active both in adopting panel and Appellate reports
and in reviewing members' implementation of WTO decisions." Id. See also Joost
Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules Are Rules-
Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L. L. 335, 338, 338 n.24 (2000)
(estimating that "almost 150 distinct matters have been brought under the DSU in
the WTO's five-year history.").
70. Pauwelyn, supra note 69, at 338.
71. Green, supra note 9, at 139.
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prestige of the regime; that the decisions of politically unaccountable
dispute settlement bodies will be perceived as lacking in legitimacy;
and that legalistic systems will fail to be sufficiently flexible to
accommodate treaty rules to changing circumstances and issues. 72
The United States evidently subscribed to this view at one
point in time. During the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations,
the United States opposed the "inclusion of income tax measures
under the GATT."73 These measures "would have made a wide
range of 'tax policies' and 'domestic tax laws' subject to
mandatory legalistic GATT dispute settlement procedures."74
Presumably, U.S. opposition was based on unwillingness to have
American tax laws and policies subjected to what Green calls
"quasi-judicial international review."75  Other countries
suspected that the United States "wanted to carve income tax
measures out of the national treatment obligation because it
intended to pursue discriminatory tax policies, particularly in
the area of transfer pricing regulation." 76 In the end, the United
States relented, and the national treatment obligation was
applied to income taxes, albeit in a very limited way, by
language included not in GATT, but in the General Agreement
on Trade in Services ("GATS"). 77
Green's article suggests that international tax disputes are
best resolved using "antilegalistic" methodology, as provided in
most tax treaties, despite that methodology's limitations. He
explains:
[Tihe dispute settlement procedures in tax treaties are antilegalistic.
Under most tax treaties, consultations and negotiations between
designated tax officials of the two treaty countries are the exclusive
means for resolving disputes. There is no assurance that this process
actually will produce a resolution. Even if it does, the resolution is
likely to represent a political compromise rather than a reasoned
decision based on the application of legal rules. Moreover, the
mechanism is intended to deal with relatively fact-specific disputes. It
is highly improbable that it will succeed in resolving a dispute
involving a policy-level conflict between a domestic tax law and a
treaty obligation. The resolution of such disputes likely will require
resort to diplomatic channels.
78
In other words, a tax dispute like the one between the EU and
72. Id.





78. Id. at 137.
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the United States over FSCs might better lend itself to a
settlement negotiated by tax experts or, in the alternative, to a
diplomatic solution, rather than to a legalistic resolution under
the rubric of the WTO.
IV. THE WTO PANEL RULING ON FOREIGN SALES
CORPORATIONS
On November 18, 1997, the EU requested consultations
with the United States to discuss why the FSC regime allegedly
violated the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures ("SCM").79 On March 4, 1998, the Europeans
requested that the consultations be extended, and included in
its argument that FSCs also violated the GATT Agreement on
Agriculture, specifically Article 19.80 On three occasions, the
representatives of the two sides consulted, but no settlement or
resolution was achieved.8' On July 1, 1998, a WTO panel
convened to hear and decide the EU dispute with the United
States. 2
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body assembled a panel of
three experts to hear the case.8 3 Meetings were held in February
and March of 1999 to hear the EU's complaint and the American
response.8 4 The crux of the complaint was the EU's contention
that the U.S. tax code provided tax treatments for FSCs that are
in effect impermissible export subsidies.8  The EU alleged that
the tax incentives were illegal because the United States was
forgoing the tax normally due for the benefit of FSCs. This
allegedly violated Articles 3.1(a) and 3.1(b) of the SCM
Agreement.8 6 Article 1.1 of the SCM defines the term "subsidy"
and reads as follows:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist
if: (a)(i) there is a financial contribution by a government or any other
public body within the territory of a member, i.e. where: (ii)
79. WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 1.1. The complaint alleged that the
United States violated Articles 3, 3.1(a), 3.1(b), and 8. See id. para. 3.2.
80. See id. para. 1.2.
81. See id. para. 1.3
82. See id.
83. See id. para. 1.6. Barbados, Canada, and Japan all reserved the right to
participate in the proceeding as third parties. Id. para. 1.5. The panel heard their
complaints at the February 10, 1999 meeting. See id. para. 1.7.
84. See id. para. 1.7
85. See id. para. 4.106.
86. See id.
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government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected
and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred.87
The WTO panel agreed with the EU's assessment.88 The panel
concluded the United States was forgoing revenue and thereby
conferring a benefit on FSCs.8 9
FSCs achieved tax benefits in a complicated way. The FSC
received a commission payment from the parent corporation for
work done on the parent's behalf.90 The paid commission was
tax deductible to the parent, and was received by the FSC as its
profit or income.91 At the FSC level, a portion of the profit
received would then be exempt from U.S. tax as foreign source
income. 92 The commission was then calculated using the special
FSC administrative pricing rules, or the traditional arm's length
pricing rules. 93
Administrative pricing rules were used to determine the
portion of profit or income allocable to a subsidiary after the
total profit or income had been determined at the parent level.
The rules approximated the payment received by the subsidiary
to what the product or service performed by the subsidiary
would have cost the parent on the open market. The United
States had adopted the arm's length pricing principle in I.R.C. §
482. 94 However, I.R.C. § 925 allowed an FSC to choose between
two fixed formula methods of taxation, instead of applying §
482, which would have taxed the FSC as the OECD's Transfer
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations ("Guidelines") advocated.95 I.R.C. § 925 stated
that the transfer price "shall be in the amount which allows the
FSC to derive taxable income 'which does not exceed the
greatest of the amount resulting from each of the
administrative pricing rules in section 482"96
The EU asked the panel to determine whether the U.S.
administrative pricing rules complied with WTO standards. 97
87. Id. para. 4.268
88. See id. para. 7.102.
89. See id. para. 7.103.
90. See David H. Culpepper & Steven C. Wells, Tax Incentives for Small
Exporters, 176 J. ACCOUNTANCY 39, 42 (October 1993).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.; I.R.C. § 925 (2000).
94. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 4.229
95. See id. para. 4.231.
96. See id. para. 4.232.
97. See id. para. 4.234.
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Administrative pricing rules were originally part of the DISC
legislation of the 1970s, and the panel viewed these rules as a
major departure from the basic principles used by other
developed countries to deal with the problem of transfer pricing
between related companies.98 The Guidelines were the result of
an international consensus concerning how to deal with these
issues.99 The EU claimed that I.R.C. § 935 violated the
Guidelines. The Guidelines stated "the arm's length principle is
generally based on a comparison of the conditions in a controlled
transaction with the conditions in the transactions between
independent enterprises. "100 They also provided, "In order for
such comparisons to be useful, the economically relevant
characteristics of the situations being compared must be
sufficiently comparable." 10 1 The Guidelines did state, however,
that alternative methods of arriving at arm's length pricing may
be used.10 2
Taxpayers achieved the greatest tax advantage by using
I.R.C. § 482 as a cap instead of a floor as the Guidelines
intended. FSCs could even make the choice after the exact
amount of the commission was determined and before the FSC
had filed its taxes. FSCs could also choose to apply one pricing
method to all of the transactions for the year, or apply a
different one to each transaction.
The transfer pricing rules were important because
immediately upon receipt of the commission, the FSC
distributed the same amount back to the parent as a dividend.
Thus the parent received the dividend tax-free. 10 3 The panel
concluded, however, that the administrative pricing rules did
not have to be ruled upon since the panel had previously
determined that the United States violated the SCM
Agreement. 0 4
Another factor influencing the panel's determination was
the geographic location of the majority of FSCs. The panel found
that 74 percent of all FSCs were located in U.S. possessions. 0 5
The U.S. Virgin Islands alone was home to sixty-six percent of
98. See id. para. 4.224
99. See id. para. 4.223
100. Id. para. 4.226 (citing OECD Guidelines 1.6 (1994)).
101. Id. (citing OECD Guidelines 1.15 (1994)).
102. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 4.227.
103. See Culpepper & Wells, supra note 90, at 43.
104. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 7.127.
105. See id. para. 4.199.
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all FSCs. 106 The panel found that these percentages illustrated
that FSCs lacked truly "foreign" character. For example, I.R.C. §
932 stated that the Virgin Islands would be treated as part of
the United States for "purposes of determining U.S tax liability
of U.S. citizens or residents with Virgin Islands income." 10 7 Yet
FSCs residing in the Virgin Islands were treated as foreign
corporations, a factor which the panel took into consideration in
determining whether the tax exemptions were, in effect,
subsidies provided by the United States. 08
Some background in the U.S. corporate tax system is
beneficial to understand the EU's complaint and the panel's
ruling. The U.S. tax system is a direct tax system. It taxes all
American citizens and entities, regardless of their location, on
the basis of worldwide income. 0 9 As corporate shareholders
owned most FSCs, this review will focus on the tax affects for
corporations.
Normally, an American corporation must pay taxes to the
United States on all income, unless it can find a provision in the
tax code that provides some relief from taxation. To alleviate the
potential double taxation faced by American corporations with
foreign operations, the I.R.C. contains provisions to ameliorate
double taxation, as do the tax codes of most countries. The I.R.C.
allows corporations a credit, 10 in the amount of the foreign
taxes paid or accrued on foreign source income, to the extent the
foreign source income is taxable in the United States."' This
106. Id.
107. Id. para. 4.202.
108. Another very important location for FSCs is Barbados. See id. para. 4.205.
In 1984, when Congress passed the FSC legislation, the Barbados Parliament
enacted the Foreign Sales Act of 1984, which basically exempted FSCs from paying
taxes on income arising from their operations, except for income on investments
made in Barbados. Id. To be a valid FSC in Barbados, a company must engage in
foreign trade transactions and be licensed as an FSC in Barbados. Id. The fee to
obtain a license is $1,000, and for a small FSC it is $500. Id.
It is interesting to note that Barbados was one of three countries that reserved
the right to be a third party in the dispute. It is ironic that a country clearly
benefiting from the existence of FSCs may also be involved in the demise of U.S.
FSC legislation. Barbados's reasons for being part of the dispute are difficult to
understand.
109. Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight Tax Harmony in the European Community
Leaves Much to be Desired, 43 TAX EXEC. 257, 257-58 (July-Aug. 1991).
110. A credit is more valuable than a deduction because a credit is a dollar for
dollar reduction in the amount of taxable income whereas a deduction is merely a
reduction in the amount of tax owed.
111. The term foreign source income is a term of art referring to income not
effectively connected to a trade or business in the United States, and so it is not
taxable in the U.S. In essence, it is income that is exempt from U.S. taxes because a
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income is classed as exempt foreign source income.
Achieving the classification of exempt foreign source income
is difficult and complex because U.S. taxpayers have an
incentive to classify as much of their income as possible as
foreign source if the foreign location has a lower tax rate than
the United States." 2 To encourage exports, Congress classified
income earned by FSCs as exempt foreign source income,
creating the fiction that it was not effectively connected to a
U.S. trade or business. FSC income received this classification
even though one of the requirements to be an FSC was that it be
established in a U.S. possession, or a foreign country that had
an exchange-of-information treaty with the United States. The
panel found that the American parent companies were using
FSCs to avoid paying taxes on approximately thirty percent of
their foreign trade income.113
An American corporation operating in a foreign country
through an entity established in that country could defer
payment of U.S. tax on the foreign source income, until the
income was repatriated to the United States. Repatriation
normally occurred through dividends paid by the foreign
corporation to the American shareholders. The corporate
shareholders received a deduction for the entire amount of
dividend received as long as the funds remained in the corporate
solution." 4
To avoid potential abuse by moving to tax havens or
permanently deferring repatriation, the I.R.C. contains anti-
abuse sections. The main anti-abuse section in the I.R.C.
classifies certain foreign corporations as controlled foreign
corporations ("CFCs")." 5 Shareholders of CFCs are required to
include in their gross income their pro rata portion of the CFC's
undistributed income, thus removing any benefit from deferring
distributions perpetually. To encourage exports, in I.R.C §§
951(e) and 954(d) and (e), Congress specifically exempted FSCs
from the anti-abuse provisions. 116 If these exclusions had not
have existed, FSCs would have been required to pay taxes on all
their income." 7
foreign jurisdiction has taxed, or will tax it. I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a), 864(c)(3),(4)
(2000).
112. Treas. Reg. § 1.921-3T (2000).
113. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para 4.212.
114. I.R.C. § 243 (2000).
115. I.R.C. §§ 951-962 (2000).
116. See I.R.C. §§ 951(e), 954(d), (e) (2000).
117. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 4.221.
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When the aforementioned tax features of the American
system were combined with the FSC rules, the effect was
substantial. The FSC received income from the parent tax-free.
The parent deducted the payment made to the FSC. The income
of the FSC was not taxable to the parent as a CFC. The parent
immediately received back the entire amount paid to the FSC
tax free in the form of a dividend from the subsidiary. The most
favorable pricing rules could be used to calculate the amount of
the payment to the subsidiary.
This combination of the preferential treatment regarding
foreign source income, the ability to choose among preferential
administrative pricing rules only available to FSCs, and other
favorable I.R.C. provisions, was ruled to be an impermissible
export subsidy. The combination resulted in the deferral of
billions of dollars in taxes that FSCs did not have to pay. 118
Thus, the EU argued, FSCs could offer lower prices on goods
because of the lack of taxation by the United States. 1 9
The WTO panel decision embraced the EU's assessment of
what a subsidy is under the SCM Agreement. 20 Enormous tax
incentives for some 6,000 companies were the result of the
combination of the above-referenced sections of the I.R.C. and
the FSC administrative pricing rules.' 2' The panel found the
specific sections of the I.R.C. it reviewed to provide an
impermissible tax subsidy to FSCs, in violation of the SCM
Agreement. 122 The panel noted that the number of FSCs had
dramatically increased and the amount of foreign trade income
had doubled in the last decade. 23
V. HOW THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION TAX EXPORT INDUSTRIES: A DISTINCTION
WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE?
The United States and the EU have completely different
perspectives regarding the FSC dispute. Initially, the United
States argued that there were a number of procedural defects in
the way the dispute came before the WTO panel. 124 On appeal,
118. See Helene Cooper, supra note 43.
119. See generally id.
120. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, paras. 7.94-7.103
121. See Cooper, supra note 43.
122. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 8.1.




the United States dropped the procedural issues and focused on
a few specific arguments which best defined its position and
rationale.
First, the United States argued that a 1981 decision by the
GATT General Council should be relevant to the case at hand.
In that 1981 decision, the General Council set forth three
general rules that were to be followed to support tax exemptions
for export-related income. 125 The rules were that: (1) the foreign
economic process did not have to be taxed by the exporting
country; (2) arm's length pricing should be observed; and (3)
measures could be adopted to avoid double taxation of foreign
income. 126 The United States claimed it complied with these
rules, asserting that a footnote added to the SCM Agreement
stated that full or partial exemption of direct taxes specifically
related to exports constitutes a legal tax exemption. 127
More specifically, footnote fifty-nine of the SCM Agreement
set forth the rules for allocating income to economic activities
outside the territory of the taxing authority.1 28 Footnote fifty-
nine states that "income from foreign economic processes may be
exempted from direct taxes." 29 The United States argued for an
interpretation consistent with footnote fifty-nine since arm's
length pricing would be irrelevant if footnote fifty-nine was not
applicable.' 30 In other words, the United States reasoned that
unless the full meaning of footnote fifty-nine was considered, the
entire concept of administrative pricing would be superfluous
and have no meaning.' 31
The panel rejected the U.S. interpretation, stating that the
1981 decision no longer applied because of the 1994
amendments to the GATT. The panel agreed, however, to review
the decision for its historical definition of a subsidy. 132
125. See Daniel Pruzin, Taxation: WTO Issues Final Panel Ruling in Foreign
Sales Corporation Dispute, 16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1657, 1658 (Oct. 13, 1999).






132. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, paras. 7.52-7.85. The 1994
amendments to the GATT included the SCM and Agricultural Agreement. See
Pruzin, supra note 125. The 1994 amendments led to the European Union's
initiation of the WTO dispute proceeding. See id. The impact of the 1994
amendments continues to be felt. The 1994 amendments reopened the subsidy issue
for the European Union. The European Union thought of bringing the case after the
amendments were passed, and the Clinton administration made an intense effort to
2001]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
Ultimately, the panel decided against the U.S. interpretation of
footnote fifty-nine, but it also refused to rule on the
administrative pricing complaints asserted by the EU. 133
The second argument advanced by the United States
concerned the differences in tax systems. The United States
argued that the EU offers tax exemptions or incentives for
exports and foreign corporations that have an effect that is
similar to that achieved by the FSC regime. 34 The panel
refused, however, to comment on whether the EU was offering
the same tax exemptions that the panel determined were in fact
subsidies. 35 Nevertheless, it is worth comparing the FSC
provisions of the I.R.C. with the effect of the EU's value added
tax ("VAT").
The United States has a system of direct taxation of income
earned during a twelve month period. 36 As discussed, both
individuals and corporations, subject to U.S. taxation, must pay
based on their worldwide income. However, foreign corporations
are exempt from direct taxation on income earned outside the
United States. 37 This means that normally, an American
corporation must pay taxes to the United States on all income,
unless it can find an I.R.C. provision that provides some relief
from taxation.
The FSC legislation was created to encourage exports by
relieving some of the income tax paid by exporting corporations.
It should be noted that due to the particulars of the division of
powers between the state and federal governments in the
United States, the federal government could only relieve some of
the direct tax burden that it places on income tax. For example,
the federal government cannot relieve any of the indirect tax
burden created by sales taxes levied by the individual states.
This is important because international tax conventions allow
the forgiveness of indirect taxes without considering such
behavior an impermissible tax subsidy. 38 If the federal
government did not relieve some of the total tax burden,
American exporters would be burdened by both federal and
state income taxes, as well as state sales taxes. Unlike the VAT
prevent that from happening. See id.
133. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12 paras. 7.92, 7.127.
134. See generally Pruzin, supra note 125.
135. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 7.127.
136. See Knight & Knight, supra note 109, at 257-58.
137. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 4.315.
138. See U.S. Exporters Get the Word: Guilty, Bus. WK., Aug. 16, 1999, at 42.
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in the EU, these sales taxes are not refundable.
Unlike the United States, most other countries, including
the European states, use systems of indirect taxation based on
taxing consumption, instead of income, when consumption
occurs and in the country where the final transaction takes
place. 139 An example of this form of taxation is the VAT. The
VAT is usually applied to all goods and services, with exceptions
normally made for items considered basic or essential, such as
food, children's clothes, and rent. The most prominent form of
VAT is the credit-method VAT. Under this type of VAT, the tax
is imposed on the sale price of each item from the production
process through the last sale to the ultimate consumer. 140
Double taxation of the same value added is avoided by allowing
each subsequent seller a credit in the amount of the previously
paid VAT.' 4 '
The EU applies VAT on a destination principle. 4 2 This
means that the applicable VAT rate is that of the country where
the good is sold. 43 There have been attempts aimed at making
the VAT amount more uniform throughout the EU, but each
country retains the right to set the VAT amount and its own
exemptions. The result of the destination principle is that
imports, but not exports, are subject to VAT.'"
There are two types of VAT exemptions: true exemptions
and zero-rate exemptions. 145 True exemptions apply to articles
on which VAT is not charged.1' Sellers of items that are true
exemptions do not receive a credit for the previously paid
VAT. 147 Zero-rate exemptions apply to articles on which VAT is
collected and allows the seller a credit for the VAT the seller
previously paid.' 48 Exports are zero-rate products, which means
that EU exporters receive a credit for the VAT previously
paid.149
Exports are justified as zero rate products based on the
destination principle that goods should be taxed where they are
139. See Knight & Knight, supra note 109, 257-58.
140. See Gareth E. Glaser & Richard L. Sartor, Executive Summary of "Value-
Added Taxes: A Comparative Analysis, 45 TAX ExEc. 26, 27 (Jan.-Feb. 1993).
141. See id.
142. See id. at 30.
143. See id.
144. See id.
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sold. 150 This makes exports from the EU potentially cheaper
because the exporter receives back the VAT the exporter paid.
Consequently, the exporter can reduce his sale price. Since the
EU does not tax foreign income of its corporations, many of
which have established subsidiaries in tax havens, and the
European corporations are allowed a VAT credit, EU exports are
relieved from virtually all tax burdens, whereas American
exports are not.151
Finally, international treaties specifically allow countries to
forego the collection of indirect taxes and do not consider such
behavior to be an impermissible subsidy. Nevertheless,
subsidization is exactly what is occurring. On average, the VAT
rate in the EU is approximately twenty percent. 152 EU exports
total approximately $800 billion dollars per year, making the
zero-rating of exports worth approximately $160 billion dollars
annually. 153 The United States has argued that its FSC
legislation was enacted to counter the zero rate VAT on EU
exports, and to counter the effect of U.S. taxation. 54 The United
States could attempt to make a case at the WTO, but it is not
likely to go far given the specific exemption in various applicable
conventions.
VI. THE U.S. APPEAL TO THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT BODY
Obviously, the WTO panel ruling disappointed the United
States. But some American tax specialists believe the decision
could be a blessing in disguise if it now enables the United
States to follow its own taxation policies instead of trying to
cater to demands imposed by agreements like the SCM and
Agricultural Agreements.'55 The decision also raises questions
as to whether the United States will continue to be part of the
WTO.156 As Senator Philip M. Crane (R-Illinois) has observed,
"There is going to be a lot of critical examination [of the WTO in
150. See John McElroy, V.A.T. Debacle: Does America Subsidize Its Imports?,
163 AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES 29, 30 (Dec. 1983).
151. See Trade - A Tussle Over Tax, ECONOMIST, Mar. 4, 2000, at 75.
152. See id. at 76.
153. See id.
154. See U.S. Exporters Get the Word: Guilty, BUS. WK., Aug. 16, 1999, at 42.
155. See Corbett B. Daly, Taxation: Archer Urges Barshefsky to Settle FSC




Congress]. "157 He asked rhetorically, "Is it worth it to be a
member of the WTO? What is in it for us?"15 8
On October 28, 1999, the United States notified the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") of its intention to appeal the
panel ruling.15 9 Then, on November 2, 1999, the United States
appeared to do an about face, informing the Chairman of the
Appellate Body and the Chairman of the DSB of its decision to
withdraw its appeal. 160 Meanwhile, the United States and the
EU tried to negotiate a settlement. The settlement talks did not
last long, however. On November 26, 1999, the United States
once again notified the DSB of its intention to appeal the panel
ruling. 16' It is interesting to note that both the United States
and the EU submitted appellant and appellee briefs on certain
issues raised in the panel decision. 62 Also, Canada and Japan
each filed third party participant submissions. 63
The arguments made to the Appellate Body by both sides
were essentially the same as those made by each party since the
beginning of the dispute. First, the United States argued that
the panel decision should be reversed because the panel had not
read footnote fifty-nine of the SCM Agreement in conjunction
with other provisions of the Agreement dealing with
subsidies.'6 The Appellate Body concluded, though with some
reservation, that the panel ruled correctly that Section 3.1 of the
SCM Agreement established a "but for" test to determine if a tax
exemption was a subsidy.16 The Appellate Body found that this
test does not require that footnote fifty-nine be read in
conjunction with other parts of the SCM Agreement in order to
157. Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, Vote on U.S. Membership in WTO likely to
be Spirited in Wake of Seattle, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 102, 103 (Jan. 20, 2000).
158. Id. For a discussion of the relative benefits and disadvantages of WTO
membership from the American perspective, see Stephan, supra note 12.
159. See Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 15, para. 4.
160. See id.
161. See id. The dispute settlement process is analogous to the U.S. court's
amicus system. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 60, at 435. Therefore, another
country that wants to have some say in the outcome of the decision is able to file
briefs in support of that country's position on the issue. See id. It is important to
remember that the WTO dispute settlement process is designed to settle only the
dispute between the primary parties. Thus, if a third party wanted to bring a claim
at a later time, that country would be able to do so. See id. at 434.
162. See Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 15, para. 4.
163. See id. Notably Barbados did not file a submission with the Appellate
Review Body. See id.
164. See id. para. 42.
165. See id. para. 91.
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determine whether a tax exemption is in effect a subsidy.166
Therefore, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that
the United States was providing FSCs with illegal subsidies in
violation of sections 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.167
Second, the Appellate Body addressed the American
assertion that the 1981 GATT decision had relevance to the
present dispute. Again, the United States contended that the
1981 decision by the GATT panel confirmed that the definition
of subsidy must be read in conjunction with footnote fifty-
nine. 68 The Appellate Body concluded that this was the same
argument the United States used to claim that it did not violate
specific sections of the SCM Agreement. 169 The Appellate Body
reaffirmed that footnote fifty-nine did not have to be followed in
order to determine the definition of subsidy. It went on to
declare that the 1981 GATT ruling was relevant to the FSC
dispute only to the extent that it provided background
information in regard to the history of the dispute. 170
Next, the Appellate Body considered American arguments
concerning the Agricultural Agreement, and concluded that the
United States was in violation of the Agricultural Agreement in
regard to subsidies. 171 The panel ruled that the American tax
exemptions given to FSCs violated Articles 3.3 and 9.1(d) of the
Agricultural Agreement, stating, "Because FSC subsidies reduce
an exporter's income tax liability with respect to marketing
activities, they effectively reduce the cost of marketing
agricultural products."172 The panel added, "In any event, a
subsidy such as the FSC, which is provided to offset costs of
marketing agricultural products, should be considered to reduce
the costs of marketing agricultural products."173
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body disagreed with the earlier
panel's finding that the United States had violated the
Agricultural Agreement. The subsidies that are permissible
under the Agricultural Agreement are listed in Article 9.1.174
The Appellate Body ruled, however, that Article 9.1 could be
166. See id. paras. 93-94.
167. See id. para. 121.
168. See id. para. 104.
169. See id. para. 103.
170. See id. para. 120.
171. See id. paras. 122-54.
172. WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 7.155.
173. WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 7.156.
174. See Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 15 para. 130.
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read together with Article 3.3 of the agreement.' 75 Doing so, the
Appellate Body concluded that the United States was in
compliance with both articles of the Agreement. 176 Thus the
Appellate Body ruled that the panel was not correct in its
interpretation that the United States was providing subsidies to
its agricultural industries through FSCs.177 This was, however,
the only section of the panel's decision that was reversed by the
Appellate Body.
Lastly, the Appellate Body considered the panel's decision
not to rule on the EU's claim that the United States had
violated administrative pricing procedures. 178 It refrained,
however, from ruling on the matter, explaining instead that
"having found that the exemptions provided by the FSC scheme
are an export subsidy inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, it
would be neither necessary nor appropriate for us to make a
further and independent ruling on the consistency of that
scheme's administrative pricing rules."179 In other words,
because the ruling of the panel regarding the SCM Agreement
had been upheld, the Appellate Body found no reason to
examine the administrative pricing issue.180
In conclusion, the Appellate Body recommended that the
DSB ask the United States to bring its FSC regime into
compliance with its ruling.' 81 The Appellate Body emphasized in
its concluding paragraphs that its decision applies only to the
parties in the case, and that by making its decision the WTO
was not advocating one tax system over another. 182 Finally, the
Appellate Body reminded each member of the WTO that by
becoming a WTO member each had imposed on itself an
obligation to comply with all the terms of the agreements into
which each might enter. 83
VII. OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
As discussed, the EU has asked the WTO to approve some
four billion dollars in trade sanctions against a wide range of
175. See id. para. 132.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. paras. 172-73.
179. WTO Panel Report, supra note 12, para. 7.127.
180. See Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 15 para. 173.
181. See id. para. 178.
182. See id. para. 179.
183. See id. para. 180.
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American goods as compensation for tax breaks granted to
FSCs.184 The Europeans have agreed to postpone
implementation of the penalty tariffs until a WTO panel rules
on the legality of the FSC Repeal Act that went into effect in
November 2000.185 That panel decision is expected sometime
during the summer of 2001.186 In the meantime, American policy
makers have time to ponder a number of options.
One option simply is to let the proposed sanctions take
effect if the WTO panel finds the FSC Repeal Act unacceptable.
The sanctions imposed by the Europeans would then in effect
become the price that the United States is willing to pay to
maintain an FSC regime that the WTO considers illegal under
global trading rules. The message sent by the United States
would be that it is prepared for, or even welcomes, a tit-for-tat
escalation of what appears to be a widening trade war. The
United States could, as discussed, respond to European
sanctions in the FSC matter by pursuing its own array of claims
against the EU at the WTO. For example, as the former Clinton
administration threatened, this could include challenging the
subsidies that European governments have provided Airbus to
facilitate development of the A3XX super jumbo jet.18 7
Another option for the United States would be to try to
achieve a negotiated settlement with the EU. Such an
agreement could take the form of a narrow accord, limited in its
scope to the taxation of American exports, or it could come as a
comprehensive settlement across the entire spectrum of trade
disagreements that divide the EU and the United States.88
Among other things, the two sides are currently at odds over
banana imports, hormone treated beef restrictions, subsidies to
Airbus, farm subsidies, and data processing. 89 A negotiated
settlement might possibly approximate the damages owed to
each party and contain broad legislative aims that each side
should implement regarding future behavior.
Such a settlement would not be easy to achieve. Some
commentators say that the EU is still bitter about American
attempts to pry open certain of its markets-hence the discord
184. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
188. See Archer Urges Cautious Approach on Foreign Sales Corps., CONGRESS
DAILY/AM, Mar. 9, 2000.
189. See Joseph Kahn, U.S. Loses Dispute on Export Sales, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 24,
2000, at A13; Another Trade War?, ECONOMIST, Feb., 26, 2000, at 88.
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over bananas, beef, aerodynamics, agricultural subsidies, and
data processing. 190 Some think the EU wants to savor its victory
in the FSC matter, and regard the Europeans as generally
unwilling to admit defeat in the panel decisions they have
lost. 191 As Gerry O'Driscoll, an economist who is reportedly close
to President George W. Bush, has put it, "The Europeans keep
tweaking America's nose on trade and, in the end, they're going
to get a reaction."19 2
The truth is that uncooperative attitudes on both sides raise
the specter of the fundamental obstacle to achieving a
negotiated settlement-namely, traditional notions of
sovereignty. Each side wants to keep its sovereign prerogatives
intact; each guards its sovereignty jealously. 193 Viewed from this
perspective, many of the current disputes between the United
States and the EU can be traced to domestic issues even though
they reverberate in the foreign trade arena. For example, the
European ban on hormone treated beef is justified as a domestic
health issue. In much the same way, FSC tax regulations are
justified as domestic tax policy aimed merely at avoiding double
taxation. For a settlement to succeed, each party will have to
accept some degree of outside "interference" in even its most
sensitive "internal" affairs and domestic policy-making.
Furthermore, for a negotiated settlement to work, both
Europeans and Americans will have to be content in the long
run with all that this implies because, no matter what
settlement is achieved, compliance with it will still be voluntary.
Another thorny issue that would have to be negotiated is
how to address the problems that stem from the different tax
systems in the EU and the United States. The two sides would
probably have to come to some accord that would allow the
American federal government a means of providing a benefit
similar to that provided under the credit method VAT in the
EU. One solution might be a system whereby some of the state
190. See Kahn, supra note 189.
191. See Charles M. Bruce, The WTO's Ruling: Let's All Relax, 86 TAx NOTES
1927, 1927-32 (Mar. 27, 2000).
192. Conor O'Clery, World News (Inauguration of President Bush): EU Wary of
New US Ideas on Free Trade, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 22, 2001, available at 2001 WL
4516808.
193. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act of 2000, supra note 19, wherein former President Clinton alluded to a
certain measure of sovereign affront when he emphasized, "Never before has the
United States had to enact legislation-and particularly legislation in the sensitive
field of taxation policy-in order to implement the findings of a dispute settlement
panel of the World Trade Organization (WTO)."
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sales taxes paid by American exporters during the production
process be credited against foreign source income taxed by the
United States. Another might be to use currently existing I.R.C.
sections that apply to all corporations, not only to FSCs, to
achieve the same or similar results as those achieved under the
old FSC provisions. 194
Given all that is at stake, a serious effort that overcomes
these and other obstacles to a negotiated agreement seems to be
the most desirable result. The current controversy over FSCs
threatens much more than to become the costliest battle yet in
the European-American trade war-it threatens the continued
existence of the WTO. 195 As discussed, legalistic systems of
dispute resolution can lack the flexibility required to address
changing circumstances or, by extension of the same logic,
political imperatives.1 96 When this happens, conspicuous cases of
noncompliance can result. These conspicuous cases of
noncompliance can undermine ongoing relationships, such as
the one between the EU and the United States, as well as the
efficacy of the WTO system itself. Such a result as an outgrowth
of the FSC matter looms all the more ominously, coming as it
does at a time when some American scholars and policy-makers
are questioning the value and even the legality of continued
membership in the WTO. 97
It would be both undesirable and ironic if the current
controversy over FSCs were to in fact damage permanently in
some way the relationship between the EU and the United
States, or the viability of the WTO as an institution. It would be
undesirable because the dispute has escalated at a time when
the WTO otherwise appears to be gaining acceptance worldwide
194. See Bruce, supra note 191.
195. See, e.g., O'Clery, supra note 192:
Trade is the main issue of contention between the US and the EU. The
old "beef and bananas" rows inherited by the Bush team, and some
more recent ones over US protectionist measures, are so serious that if
mishandled, economists say they could precipitate a breakdown in
global trade diplomacy.
See id.
196. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 12; Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal
Power to International Organizations: New Problems With Old Solutions, 85 MiNN.
L. REV. 71 (2000) (questioning whether power and authority held by the United
States government has been impermissibly transferred to international




as a reliable and efficacious arbiter of trade disputes. 198 It would
be ironic because scrapping, or at least modifying, the FSC
scheme in a way that might address WTO concerns as to its
legality could well be in the best long-term interest of the
United States anyway.
Consider, for example, the view that tax breaks for domestic
export industries-in effect, export subsidies-tend to do more
harm than good by reducing those industries' global
competitiveness. Their overall impact on domestic and foreign
economies is detrimental, as well. The Economist has observed:
Several justifications are offered for the existence of export subsidies.
They include the need to nurse infant industries; to compensate for
protectionism abroad; to overcome capital market problems faced by
firms in small countries; to promote employment; and to keep trade
balances positive. The subsidies can range from simple ad valorem
payments to companies based on the size of their export sales, to
complex systems of tax credits, loans, insurance policies and price
supports.
These policies, however, bring with them some huge problems. Any
company coddled by a subsidy has less incentive to improve its bottom
line (and hence make the subsidy unnecessary). Tax revenues used for
subsidies are distributed in a way that makes them regressive. And
artificially low prices supported by subsidies may force more efficient
producers in importing countries out of business. Besides harming
domestic producers in poor importing countries, export subsidies may
crowd out competing trade from other countries whose governments
are too poor to retaliate.
199
Be that as it may, American lawmakers are unlikely to
eliminate or significantly reduce the offending FSC tax breaks
any time soon-not if recent history is any indication. As
discussed, the EU regards the most recent United States
attempt to address the issue legislatively, as embodied in the
FSC Repeal Act, as more offensive than the law that came
before.200
There are, however, hopeful signs that reconciliation
remains possible. Some European policymakers see the coming
to power of a new presidential administration in Washington as
an opportunity for the United States and the EU to make a
fresh start.201 For example, Stephen Byers, the United
198. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
199. See Going Too Far in Support of Trade, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2000, at 88.
200. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., EU, U.S. Should Work Towards Ending Trade Disputes-UK's
Byers, AFX NEWS, Feb. 6, 2001, available at Westlaw ALLNEWSPLUS Database,
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Kingdom's Trade and Industry Secretary, declared in a
February 2001 address that the "time is right" for the two sides
to "put the disputes of the past behind them."20 2 Byers went on
to state, "Over recent years, there have been too many trade
disputes between Europe and the United States. Whether over
bananas, foreign sales corporations, hushkits in aeroplanes or
hormone treated beef, we cannot allow the benefits of trade to be
lost."20 3 Byers called for steps to be taken to resolve trade
disputes "soon after they arise, and not just send every issue
away to be dealt with [by] the WTO's dispute settlement
mechanisms."2 4 Whether the voices of reconciliation can prevail
remains to be seen.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As this article has shown, the current dispute between the
United States and the EU over American tax breaks for FSCs
threatens to become the costliest battle yet in an escalating
trade war between the United States and Europe. Moreover, the
ongoing controversy poses a threat to the viability of the WTO
dispute settlement process, and perhaps even to the continued
existence of the WTO. This possibility is all the more
unfortunate, coming as it does at a time when the WTO dispute
settlement process otherwise seems to be acquiring broader
acceptance worldwide.
On October 8, 1999, a WTO panel found that the FSC
regime, from which thousands of American corporations have
benefited, violates global trading rules by extending illegal
subsidies to American export industries. The WTO Appellate
Body subsequently upheld that ruling. In response, Congress
passed, and former President Clinton in November 2000 signed
into law, the FSC Repeal Act, which purported to make the
American FSC regime WTO-compliant.
Representatives of the EU complained, however, that the
new law was even more offensive than its predecessor, and
asked the WTO to approve four billion dollars in penalty tariffs
against an array of American goods ranging from live animals to
space craft. The WTO will not authorize the sanctions proposed
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the new FSC legislation to determine whether it in fact
conforms to WTO rules. In the meantime, American policy
makers have time to consider a number of options before the
proposed sanctions take effect.
Among these options would be for the United States to
negotiate a settlement with the EU across the broad spectrum of
American-European trade disagreements, or at least one that is
specific to FSCs and the taxation of domestic export industries.
For the reasons discussed, such an agreement might prove
difficult to achieve. Given all that is at stake, however, a
negotiated settlement would appear to be the most desirable
result.

